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vi l b 
FOR RELEASE OCTOBER 10, 1962 
8 :00 P.M. , E.S.T. 
C!iP.N~'ENG EUROPE AND UNITED STA'!'ES POLICIES 
Address by Se!lB.t or Mike ¥-nnsfield (D. , Montana) 
The Springfiel d Adult EC.ucatiO!l Council 
Springfield ~iblic Forum, The Phillips Lecture 
Technical High School, Springfield, Massacllusetts 
Wednesday, October 10, 1962, 8:00 P.M. 
t.JIII ha.11e. 
Alth~~h itAa.. tsken an inordinate length of time to 
w'll 
cor.q1lete it, the recordAshowf that the 87~~ Co~ess has disposed 
tl \ '\ 
I -:: 
of a substantial amount of p'\1.'-Jlic business . For this work, it will 
be praiseC. or bl~e~--at least uatil early November--dependi~ in 
no small pe.rt, I should ·i;hi::lk, on one ' s political preC:.ilections. 
~e Congress also failed to get through certain significant items 
of b~siness. And for this, too , it will be praised or blamed, at 
least t!ntil early November. 
In the closing days of the 87th Co~ress, however, two 
~ajor ~easures were clear~d . Praise cr b~arue a~d po!itical pre-
dilections, notwithstand..~.J~, these measures are of irnnense impor-
t?~cG to ~~e nation. 
I refer, first, to the foreign aid appropriation. We cay 
deplore this appropriation as a waate of money, a3 an invitation to 
for.ei ~ il'Jgrati t-o.1de or worse. We r:J.9.Y praise it as an act of far-
si~ted bu~nitarianism or enli~tened self-interest. 
Em.·eyer "e may regard. it, there is no escapix.g the fact 
t!~t foreisn aid is a critical geer in the intricate machinery of 
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the nation's foreign relations . It has continued to turn, more or 
less adequately, for many years and through several administrations 
of both political parties. It is no overstatement to say that if 
the Congress had removed the gear or crippled it by denying an ample 
appropriation it would have risked bringing down the entire structure 
on which the peace and security of the nation has rested for many 
years. Faced with that reality, more than a sufficient n~er of 
Senators and Representatives were inclined to the course of prudence 
with respect to this progr.am. Members of both parties acted to 
sustain the security and peace of the United States. 
This is not to say that misgivings were absent on the part 
of members who voted for foreign aid. Many entertained seri~JS doubts 
abo~t one or more aspects of the aid-program. ~~y I say, in all 
frankness, thet I personal~ share some of these doubts. 
I do not believe, for example, that we can or should accept 
as satisfactory for the indefinite future a course of foreign policy 
which places great reliance on a continued outflow of dollar grants 
to other nations . Nor do I believe that we should accept by force 
of habit a course of sustaining the independence of nations else-
where by maintaining aid-dependent governments in a style to which 
they may have become accustomed. Nor do I believe that the long-
range interests of this nation are served by casting aid for the 
economic development of emergent nations, a problem which has a 
rationale of its own, in the framevork of a competitive struggle 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
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But the intelligent resolution of these and other doubts 
does t:.ot lie i::1 the s :.ldden smashi:.:~g of the gear of foreign aid wi t!l 
all t!lat that implies to the total machi~ery of foreign policy and, 
he~ce, to our peace snd security. I believe, rather, that we must 
look for the resolution of the doubts in a continuing alertness to 
the cl"l..anging realities of the ::.nternational stt~tion. We nrllSt look 
for it in constrl!ctive adjustments in the foreign policies by which 
we seek to deal with these realities. Al!d we must look for it, 
fina:::..ly, in a continuous re -cx·dering of both objective and administra-
tion i~ the aid-p:.:-ogr3Jjl i tsel:f, as circtllll.Ste.ilces 0J.sewhere and at 
hQ:Ile change. In these ways we r::Jay a"li.icipate, with some realism, 
the dB:.f H!:en the depe!lde..1cy of others on the more c.ubious end costly 
elements of the aid-mech~ism may came to an orderly end. Indeed, 
we 'LJE.Y look forward to the day when the dependency of our O''m policies 
for peece and secl!ri ty on these same du!:>ious elem~nts may also come 
to an orderly e!ld. 
For this reaso!l, emong o'thers, it seems to me that the 
P:reside:.~.t' s !lew trade policy is the n:.ost important act of the recent 
sessiou of the Congress . This fi:::-st I!!B.,1or revision of foreig.'l trade 
policy si:J.ce the enactment of the Recipro.!al Trade P:-ogram a quarter 
of a cent"o.lry ago places in the hands of the Presid~nt authority to 
d.es.l ef:tecti Yely with r-ecent changes in the pa tkrns of in-rer!.la tic::1al 
trade. The program has g-reat significance for the continv.ed gr~h 
of ou.-r own domestic economy, for that growth is now i:1terwoven with 
an expa!ldi::g oversea.::> trade. But even greater, per~ys, are the 
possfbili:..i es which are ope::1ed by the new t::ade program for placing 
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our security and well-being on a more stable and equitable and, 
hopefUlly, a less costly basis than that '..Vhich nmr prevails. 
In this latter connection, the new trade law bears a 
di~ect relationsoip to the focus of tonight's discussion. It has 
particular relevance to Europe, to a changing Europe, and to our 
relations with that region. 
I he.ve e.li·eady referred to the need for a contin':ling 
alertness to the evolving situation abroad. !t is essential to 
effective foreign policy that we do not imprison ourselves in a 
sel:f-fashiou.ed cage of outworn facts and ri tualis~~ic sloga:1s. 
Certa.i:U.y, lve ought not forget the experiences of the past . But, 
equally, we must be alert to tae realities of the present and try 
Otu'" best to antici!?a. te the needs of the fut'.'..re. 
This alertness is most essential with respe~t to Europe. 
For Europe has long been at the core of our foreign policies, and 
Europe is che.uging rapidly. It is chal:lging, moreover, in ways which 
are likely to require a~j·~tments in policies on a scale more exten-
sive than a:n:y we have la..:.mm in the past decade. 
We cannot yet define the edj~ls tme:::1ts which may be desirable, 
possible , or, i~deed, inevitable in the years aeea&. Our policies 
interact with the policies of other nations and the courses which 
they take will surely affect our own. B'..lt lve will discern the lines 
of adjustment, and we sha.il have a better chance to formulate effec-
tive adjustments as we deepen our understanding of what is presently 
tr~nspiring in ~~ope . 
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Those of you who have traveled from time to time on that 
continent may have been struck by the obvious manifestations of change 
over the years. Indeed, a great change is readily evident in such 
simple matters as the progressive improvement in the dress of the 
people and the worsenil:Jg of the traffic problems in the major 
European cities. It is evident in the copious availability of food 
and other consumer goods, in the general intensity of commercial and 
industrial activity. 
The present look of Western Europe, to one who saw it ten 
or fifteen years ago, is that of a beaning prosperity. And, indeed, 
the economic indicators sustain the apparent. Western Europe is 
prosperous, and it is dynamic. It is producing, investing, trading--
internally and externally--and consuming at unprecedented levels. 
There is a general belief that this qynamism is due to the 
Common Market. The fact is that much of the economic momentum was 
generated in the European countries on an essentially national but 
cooperative basis, even before the Market arrangements began to go 
into effect. We may anticipate, therefore, that there is much more 
to come if the Camnon Market continues to 11 ve up to its initial 
promise w::.d, if the cooperative concepts of the Market are extended 
outward to other nations. 
In a.ey event, the atmosphere of Western Europe in 1962 makes 
it difficult to recall the Europe of 1945--the devastated Europe, 
stunned by long years of privation, by the incredible brutality and 
massive destructiveness of the war. It is difficult, even, to recall 
the Europe of 1950 or 1951--the Europe struggling to its feet with the 
help of the Marshall Plan. 
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Difficult though it may be, it is essential that we recall 
these earlier Europes. For it was in those settings that our basic 
postwar comprehensions of the European situation were formed, compre-
hensions which persist to same extent even today although circumstances 
have changed greatly. 
We saw Western Europe, then, as hurt almost beyond help, 
threatened by revolutianar,y upheaval from within and aggression tram 
w1 thou.t. We saw Western Europe dependent on this nation for its very 
subsistence, let alone the revival or survival of its freedom. And 
after the Berlin blockade, we saw Europe, as a whole, split beyond 
ar:ry expectation of healing between the monolithic oppressive Stalinist 
system in the East and the reviving free nations of the West. And 
we saw, in a divided Germany the wedge of a deepening division in a 
nation and a continent. 
Throughout the early postwar years, our policies were reason-
ab~ attuned to the realities of the European situation. They were 
policies which could produce more and more vehement slogans of libera-
tion, more and more speeches in the Congress on liberation, but, 
unfortunately, not the act,;a.li ty of a liberation in Eastern Europe, 
as we saw with striking cla!"it;y at the time of the Hungarian uprising. 
But they were policies which, with less and less fanfare, were appro-
priate to the restoration of Western Germany, the recovery of Western 
Europe and to the protection of its renewed vitality and freedom. 
Western Europe readily accepted our leadership in those 
years. Cynics might note that the Europeans had little choice. But 
I prefer to think that our leadership was accepted i .n major part because 
it was an understanding , effective and responsible leadership. We 
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pursued policies which Western Europeans recognized as serving their 
interests and policies which served our own interests, by safeguarding 
the security, the peace, the p~ogress --the essential well-being--of the 
people of the United States, at a realistic and bearable cost. 
As I have noted, attitudes tend to persist even after the 
circumstances which give rise to them have changed. National policies 
s.nd administration are subject at least to the same inertia. If we 
wo··.U.d <leal effecti-vely with the Europe of 1962, therefore, we must now 
gresp firmly the fact that we are no longer dealing with the Europe of 
1945 or 1950. In Western Europe, we are no longer dealing-- to be blunt--
~rith the gaunt and shabby economic dependent, the shocked, tottering 
and willing dependent of the earlier years. On the contrary, Western 
~~ope, today, is on its feet and has been for several years. More, 
it is ru!l:Qing. 
Indeed there are certain aspects of the change which has 
taken place which border on the ironic . European currencies, for 
example, were once in little demand in the internatio~al financial 
n~rkets. Same of these ~~rencies ere now in relatively greater 
dem.a.:J.d than our o-wn. Not so long ago we legislated. inducements to 
encata"s.ge American enterprise to invest in \-!estern El;;,rope a.nd fo-.md 
very few takers. No'\oT we are concerned a.nd. properly so by the great out-
flm>' of .American capital to that region, and. we are seeking to stimulate 
lies tern European investment in this country as a partial counterbalance . 
Ox:.ce we were badgered for leans by Western Europeans . In recent years 
we m·:e bee.:! seeking a. speedu-p in repayment of various obligations and 
wba:'.; is more .• the Europe~s have been repaying in advance. Once we 
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placed ab~oad, as far as possible, orders for arms ann ~u~itioos and 
other ~teriel for NATO. Now, we are pressing the European allies to 
make their mili ta.ry purchases in the United States as a means of obtaio-
i~g foreign exchange to off-set the dollar-outflow involved in keeping 
our mili ta.ry forces in Etll'ope. 
I do not cite these examples in. dismay or alarm. The recovery 
~d prosperity of Western Europe were the ends which we sought because 
our ::JB.~.;ione.l interests are ioterwoYen with these ends. Mo:!"eover, the 
international fi~cial position of the United States is one of great 
reserves end in the past year this position has apparently strengthened. 
I cite t.~e unusual end ironic t-..:.rnabouts, rather to indicate the extent 
to which eeonOI:lic circumstances have che.nged in Wcster.a Ei.'.1 ope. 
1'he transition has not been s'J.ddeo. And as it has taken place, 
our policies --sooner or later--have geoera.lly adj\~sted to the che.."'!.ges. 
SO!lle of the examples which I have jus ·c cited are represents ti ve of 
speci~ic adj"tlStmeots . But in more general terms, we might note that 
t~e policies of postwar relief. to a stricken Europe, the poetwar loans, 
th3 M2.J.·shall Plan, have lung since passecl into histo:;:-y. With the excep-
tion of Spain, no economic aid of any ki~d has beer· extended to Western 
Etxrape for several years. 
From one-sided economic aid, i~ short, we have progressed to 
a vastly expanded two-w-ay tra~--reg-.L..ar commercial trade . This trade 
has flourished, and it now encompasses one-third of our total trade, 
$S. 3 bi:i..lion in exports to Western Europe, and $4.7 billion in imports 
from Western Europe in 1961. Compare these figures with a pre-war trade 
which, in 1938 stood at $1.2 billion in exports and $474 million in 
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imports. Apart from its other virtues, the Marshall Plan was a key 
factor in bringing about this immensely and mutually advantageous 
growth in trade. 
It is doubtful, however, that we can coast indefinitely in 
this satisfactory situation even if we so desired. It is not likely 
that we shall be able to avoid difficulties in the period ahead in 
our relations with Western Europe. The basic question which is loom-
ing is whether a surge fonrard in Western cooperation, notably in 
trade, is now possible, indeed, necessary. 
The major decisions in this connection cannot long be avoided. 
Indeed, Weste~n Europe is moving towards them largely on a self-generated 
momentum. The Inner Six countries--Germany, France, Italy, Belgium, 
Netherlands and Luxembourg--are impelled by the high initial effective-
ness of the Cammon Market into a speedup in the removal of economic 
impediments as among then~elves. As a group, moreover, they are at a 
point at which there will be a significant step forward in the freeing 
of trade with nations outside the Market or tee heightening of restric-
tions on that trade. Moreover., the very success of the Common Market 
appears to be serving as a stimt~us to integrated and quasi-independent 
European action on other IDH . :..-~r.s , particularly on the part of the core 
nations of Western Gernany e.:.::1 F·rance. And the resolution of the 
Algerian question is likely to increase this stimulus. 
Britain and other Western European nations linked in the Free 
Trade Area commonly called the Outer Seven, are also carried toward 
major decisions largely by the significance of the Common Market to 
their trade. They are drawn by both the great promise and the uncertain 
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prospects with which the Market confronts them. And finally, we are 
impelled towards major decisions not only by considerations of trade 
but because of the r~y position which all of Western Europe--and a 
changi~g Europe--occupies in the structure of policy upon which our 
peace and security depends. 
We find ourselves, in short, in a period of major transi-
tion in Western Europe during which many questions, economic and more 
than economic, are appeari~g and demanding answers. We do not yet 
know all the questions, let alone the answers. For it does not rest 
with us alone to pose the one or to compose the other . 
It is in this context that the action of the Congress in 
enacting into law the President's new trade program assumes great 
importance to the nation. In a most responsible and non-partisan 
achievement and by overwhelming vote the Congress has equipped the 
President to deal with the several possibilities which are emerging, 
all of which have great significance for the nation's security, peace 
and well-being. 
It is easy enough to visualize these possibilities in an 
optimistic light. One might look ahead, for example, to the entry of 
the United Kingdom and other European nations into the Common Market 
or, in other ways, the devising of satisfactory trade arrangements 
between the Inner Six and Outer Seven of Europe so that they will not 
find themselves at sixes and sevens. One might look ahead, too, to 
the imme~e possibilities of trade-growth between this nation and all 
of Western Ettrope, through the reciprocal removal of trade barriers, 
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in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop~ent, under the 
Ge:1eral AGreement for Tariffs and Trade end in other ways. 
Indeed these optimistic possibilities are now open. But in 
all realism we must recognize that they ar e not the only possibilities . 
In this connaction, I would poi:1t to the difficulties which have arisen 
ib the co~se of British negotiation for membership in the Common Market. 
It is ~nders~dable that there should be difficulties and cautions on 
bot~ s~des in these negotiations. ~t the heaitancies sh~ild not be 
dismissed by the glib assertio~ tl1at it is j~6t a matter of Britai:l 
"wantU.g the caKe and eati:.:lg it too . " There is more inYol Yed- -nrJ.ch more . 
And much of what is involved is ccncerned with the Commonwealth . 
We w·ill do well to re:lember that the COlOillonwea.lth, whatever its short-
com~ :.:gs, re:nai ns e. s ignificE.nt factor for restraint artJ. order and the 
evolution of freedom in a world which is never far from chaos and filled 
with tyTa.nny . It is to be hoped, therefore, that arrangements will be 
~e,~sed which permit reconciliation of new British ties with Western 
E~ope with the maintenance of the Commonwealth . For such a reconcilia-
tion may well decide whether present trends in Wester:l Europe will turn 
inward or outwa~d, t~Naras seclus~on or inclusio:l, in the direction of 
fr~entation or toward more~fective cooperation amoLg all the free 
Dations i!! meeting the worldwide problems of freedom. 
If the coming tra!!sition in Western Europe will require adjust-
~ents in our economic policies it is not unlikely that it will require 
ad.Jus l:me'lts in political a:1d defense policies . Again, it is possible 
to view the possibilities in a most optimistic light. We mi~~t assume , 
for exa~le, that tile great economic progress of Western Europe might 
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produce a steady closing of political as well as economic ranks and the 
development of more effective common approaches towards Easte:::-n Europe 
and the SoViet Union, and towards all the issues involved in a common 
advance of freedom throughout the world. One might also assume the con-
tinuation and deepeni1J.g of military coope:m. tion under NATO, with the Eu-
ropeans bearing an increased share of its costs in manpower and materiel, 
commensurate with tr.e improv~ment in their economic situation. 
Yet, we would not see the present situation fl'i.lzy if we did 
not also note certain tendencies which suggest alterr.&ative possibilities. 
We mt1st note, for example, tha.t Western policies with regard to China 
and ether parts of the Far East are by no means parallel policies, let 
alone common pclicies, and the gap vrhich has existed for years shows no 
sign of closing. That may be understandable inasmuch as the Far East 
has become incree.singly remote fr<Y.ll the concern of Western Europe even 
as it has cO!lle closer to ours. Bui; near at hand, we cannot ignore the 
fact that the profi tai:>J.e t:re.tie ar.!o. e.hi~.ping enticements which have existed 
since the breakdown in our relatio~ships with Cuba have proved too much 
for some NATO members to resist. Again, I suppose one might rationalize 
this situation by noting that many of the NATO members ar·e mari til::le 
nations and, as such, have traditional reluctances or legal restraints 
against introducing impediments to commerce on the seas, and further, 
that Cuba is somewhat remote from their immediate interests . 
But even more directly, in the North Atlantic relationship 
itself, a relationship in which, presumably, the security and other 
interests of the European members are at least equally and probably 
more at stake, we cannot fail to notice certain anomalous tendencies. 
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There are obvious differences over nuclear strategy which far from 
being resolved, appear to be deepening. Further, it is years since 
NATO established a force goal of thirty divisions in Western Europe. 
At the present time, however, there are only twenty- three divisions 
in the region, ~d so far as I am aware, the only increments to its 
s~re~gth in the past half-dscade have come from the United States 
~d West Germeny which no•r supplies half of the European contingent. 
This is the case despite the fact ~hat economic growth thro~ghout 
Wester~ Europe would appear to equip the nations of that region to 
inc~ease their expenditures for the common defense and permit us to 
reiuce o-..u-s • 
In this instance, we are confronted with an a~ost inescap-
able concl~sion that tee Western European a:lies are either most 
lackadaislcal about their security or they see the military threat 
to the North Atlantic region or at least to Western El'.u-ope in a far 
different perspective than do we . 
This conclusion, ~oreover, is reinforced by another anomaly 
in the current situation. I allude to it by pointing out that much of 
the discnssion of foreign policy in the last Congress, as in its pre-
decessors, revealed a continued deep ideological hostili~3 and security 
concern with respect to any and all relations with Es.s tern Europe. The 
Coi.lgressional concern included Yugoslavia and Poland despite the fact 
the Presidents of bota parties thro~tout the years have urged a some -
what different approa.ch at 1e ast t~o thsse two Eastern European nations. 
With this exception and despite occasional short-lived efforts 
to improve the tone of Un~ted States -Soviet relations --as for example 
during the Gen~va Conference of 1955 ewi when the"Spiri t of Camp De;1id" 
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prevailed- -our relations with Eastern Europe have, in fact, been extremely 
limited, involving minimal diplomatic anc cultural contact and small- scale-· 
i~ some instances - -trivial trade. The closed-door situation in the East 
Europeav Communist countries, of cou.rse, has been a factor in this situa-
tion . At the time the Marshall Plan was proposed, for example, the 
Eastern ~~opean governments under Stalin ' s dicta~ion isolated themselves 
almost COI!!Pletely from contact wi·tvh the West . But it is also true that 
we imposed, as a n:B.tter of policy, our own quasi-qua!'a'-ltine on relations 
with t~at region and have retai~ed it through the years. The priuoipal 
motives, appe.re:!ltly, have bceu a "bel ief that any other co-J.rse would 
adversely ef£e~t the security of the West and the hope that qt~si ­
quarantine would cont!'ibnte to a libere.tion of the Eastern Eu::.·opean 
people from oppressive Ccmm,mist govermnents. 
In auy eve~t, o·~.u- ~li~ies vith respect to &.stern EurOT?~ 
have in,Tolved stringeut trad.e control::: for many yecrs. These controls 
heve a~ted to keep O"ll!' conr.n':!rce "''i. t.h all of the &.stern Euraoean 
comtriea at a very low level. Exclusive of trade with Poland and 
~.via, it has amounted to U!l<ler 0100 :nillio:J. a ..Jl.ear. Aud the 
great b·lllk of the $100 mi:lior. consist-s of t:-ade wi-t!\ the Soviet C"nion . 
By cr.;ntrast , O'XC commerce with Yug£sk:r.la and Pola..ud, ·..:.::rtolding under a 
somewllet cased. policy, came to over $300 :million in l96J.. 
It wo-uld reasonable to assume that a parallel policy towards 
Easte-:::-n E.'.;.ro;pe would pre·.rail s:.nong our NATO allies . They are closer 
~o tha s~ce of danger, shar~ the control of the conti~ent with the 
Communts~ gover...:!ments. Their stake in the security of the West and the 
liberatior.. of Es.stern Europe "\orould appear et least eaual to our own. 
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But we look in vain, if we look for parallel policies. With the Soviet 
Union alone, for example, the trade of the NATO nations of Europe 
amounted to over $1. 5 billion in 1961. And the trade of our NA'ro allies 
with Eastern European countries, exclusive of the Soviet Union, in the 
same year came to a t otal of over $? billion. 
Indeed, in the case of West Germany, trade with East Germany 
has been about $500 _million a year for the past five years. West German 
trade with the Soviet Union alone amounted to $400 million in 19§1, equal 
to our total trade with all of Eastern Europe, including Y•soslavia and 
Poland. 
Moreover, t~e trade figurPs are a bare-bones indicator of the 
extent of increasing contact between West and East Europe. Add to it, 
a growing intr a-European tourism. Add to it, the spread of conmercial 
aviation networks unt il they embrace both parts of Europe and include 
principal European ce.rri crs . Add to it the direct rail service now 
available between Mg_scow and Rome, Pe.ris and London. Add to it new 
credit agreemet:ts and sea-gobg shipping arra:1ge::nents which facilitate 
the flow of trade between the two parts of Europe. 
What begins to emerge from these and other indicators is a 
far different portrait of t l:e all- European situation than that which 
prevailed a decade or more ago, the period in which our general cam-
prehensions were formed and our basic political and defensive policies 
established. The contemporary portrait hardly suggests a Western Europe 
cowering with fear before the threat of imminent Soviet invasion, or 
subversion fran Eastern Europe. It hardly suggests a Britain, Germany, 
France, or Ital.y which hold that the way to induce change in Eastern 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 76, Folder 23, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
- 115 -
Et:rope is to isolate it. It hardly suggests Western Eurooe st..e.!ld.iEfi 
firm or e-,..en st.ar.H)ing sti ll, insofar e.s contact with Eas ·tern Europe 
is concerned. 
On the contrary, the current si t 1lation appears to be that 
of a ~~one whi~h ~ it may be separated on ideologicalJines is 
fiucljt>.g, thrO\:gh an extensive commerce and other ccn·eacts, a tolerable 
way to li7e •ri th the division . This is a fe.r d.ifferent Europe than 
th~t. w:~ich exisf-.ed at the time our 'O!"esent policies of g,uasi - quare.nt:!.ne 
of Ea.sterro . .Eurooc were devised. It is e. far dlf:f'erent Europe than that 
which is suggested by the sitllati on in Berlin in whi.ch the trnited Ste..tes 
and the Soviet Union confront each other in a contin~o~s state of incip~­
ent conflict . 
It is a Europe, in short, which appears to ha-re changed 
marke~ly in a decaue, except a~ Berlin. So much has it char~ed that 
it suggests the desirability of a critical examination of both our com-
prehensions of the situation and the yolicies which a r e derived from 
them to dete~ine whether both may have fallen somewhat behind the times . 
We will not serve our own interas-'.;s if '"e cloa.lt the realities of the 
present situe.tion in the factaand slogans of the pest . Policies per-
sisted i n long after circumstances alter risk irrelevancy or worse . 
Certainly, we ought never to approach changes in foreign 
policy lightly . Neither ought we to fear them. We nr..i.st always be 
prepared to seek them if, in the light of altered situations, changes 
may be i:1dica.ted in terms of our own security, peace and. well-being . 
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In the end, it is the President who has the awesome responsi -
bility of decision in these matters. But I have long believed that any 
Presi~ent gains from tho~~tfUl public consideration of foreign policy. 
Nor is such consideration impossible in this country until after 
November, as Mr. Khrushchev appears t o think. T"r.e questions involved 
in oar relations with the rest of the world are not political; they are 
national . The people of t~is nation have long since shown a capacity 
to s~parate the two and, in time, to deal with those in public life who 
fail to separate them. It is with continued confidence in that cepaoity, 
therefore, tfiat I suggest to y~~ some aspects of the European situation 
and our policies, which are in need of thorough and dispassionate public 
exa'1lination. 
1. It docs net seem to me ~ea.e.onalbe, f'o!C eXBJ!I2le, to anti-
ill..!!:te thst the impact cf tile e~onomic transition in \-l~si:€rY.l Europe is 
bo;:..nd. to be felt, not only in econor.1ic matters, but throughout the 
structure of Western coopera.tion . It seems to me, further, that our 
orce pr~~onderent position of responsibility ~ust evolve into a greater 
St1a.rillg of responfiibili ty i~ li~e with the dlmin.ishing diff~:rences 
bet-waen the basio:- capa.ci ti~s of tbe E-,'rCJi)eens an~ on:>:·selves s.s the 
effa~t of Worl~ \'IN' II on El'.u-ope recec'.es i!lto t>.::. s~(>J:'Y. There is no 
failure of leadership in adjustment~ this reality. Rather , it is an 
essential of leadership. It would, indeed, be a failure if we were to 
cling to ~ excessive responsibility in Western affairs on a mistaken 
assumption that nothing has changed and the need for us is little dif-
ferent th~ it ever was a~d that special sacrifices on our part must 
contiLue. In that presumptive course lies not only unnecessary tension 
but ~ecessary cost and tLt'\llc~efisSJ.-.r risk for the se~;a-i ty of our own 
people. 
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More suitable to the present, it seems to me, is the course 
of a less ritualistic p~suit and, at the same time, a more realistic 
pursuit of interdependence among the Western nations on the basis of 
a more proximate equality of benefit and sacrifice in our relations. 
We may begin to find such a course through the new trade program and 
a great expansion of trade, not only with the Common Market but with 
all the Western European nations. Certainly, that is precisely what 
the policy is designed to permit, and I have no doubt that the Presi-
dent will pursue it with vigor. But we need to be prepared for some 
very bard and difficult bargaining in the days ahead. We must be pre-
pared to look to our national needs with the same frank concern as do 
others. Unless we are so prepared we may well find ourselves continu-
ing to carry more of the burdens of intel'dependence while enjoying 
l.ess of 1 ts benefits • We will do well, too, to make certain that the 
trade interests of La. tin America, Japan and other nations with whom 
close and fortuitous relations are enjoyed, are not shunted aside in 
the effort to strengthen the ties acrose the Atlantic. 
2. If the beginnings of the adjustments of our course are 
to be found in the new trade program, they are not likely to end with 
that program. For, I do not think that we can discount for much longer 
the existence of Western Eurc~ean concepts of security needs which 
differ cons iderab1y from our own. Nor can we i@ore the continued 
reluctance of Western European governments to increase their sacrifices 
for the common defense in the patterns which were determined some years 
ago. 
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}l.a.y I say the Europeans have an equal right to their views 
as to what may present1y be necessary to_their defense, to the common 
NA~~ defense, and every co~sideration shuuld be give~ to their views. 
But equally, we havP- a right and a responsibility to examine the extent 
of our commitment to the common defense, particularly in view of the 
f~il·..u-e to rea.ch the NATO for~e goals, in view of the consiste:1t balance 
of pa~ents deficits which we have experienced for several years, in 
vi_~-of the exos..:Jd~d European capacitY, to b~c.r a larger sha::-e of the 
commcn coste if they were so incli~ed, and in view of tr.e enormous 
burden of assistance which we have carried and are car.ryir-g, largely 
alope, with respect to other areas of the world. It would appear to 
me that, at the least, the t!me is a~eaely past d.ue when the remaining 
military a.~.O.-E_rograms to \olestern E'..n'ope shOJ.!ld :?ollow the economic aid 
progra:ns into history . Nor is it unreasonable to consider ~tion 
1\ 
in a~ expensive ground-fvrce commitment to Europe --both in manpower 
a::J.d in dolla.rs - -if a reduction might be negotiated. for a reciprocal 
withQ~awal of Soviet forces from Easte~ Europe. Any such reduction 
is, of course, inseparable fr0m a satisfactory and en<lurin~_resolution 
of t"he Be-..·lin question. Othe:r.-Yr1se, ve ·..ro"'..ll.d be in the impossible situa-
tion of :reducing forceB in Europe or.=.e e.ay only to have to ir.crease them 
the next . 
3. Prospects for auy such course are also partially dependent 
o:n. the situation in Fastern Enrope . And it is difficult to spea,k of the 
present si~ation in that region with any precision . Our public sources 
of ini'ormation are somewhat limited, to s&y the least . Nevertheless 
policies w.aich still derive from a:a interpretation of that region as 
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the Soviet monolith which it was in Stalin 1s day seem to me to be open 
to question. Certainl.y, Eastern Europe remains an area of preponderant 
Soviet influence . Certainl.y, Communist nations of the region are linked 
in the Warsaw Pact. But it is hardly accurate to see the Soviet rela-
tionship with Finland and with Poland in the same perspective; nor is 
it valid to equate the Soviet relationship with East Germany and with 
Yugoslavia, nor t~e Soviet relationship with Poland and with Bulgaria, 
Rumania or Albania. Indeed, the latter country has actually severed 
diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and sent its military mission 
packing! 
Whet mean~~. if agy, these and other differences in Eastern 
Europe may have to t.'IJ.e ;peace and welfare of the United States is an 
open question. But nothing is gained by closing our eyes to the fact 
that differences do exist or by regarding as sacrosanct policies which 
derive from earlier ass1mptions with regard to the region from the Baltic 
to the Black Sea. 
On that basis alone, the policies whi ch we have pursued more 
or less consistently with all of Eastern Europe except Finland and to 
a lesser extent with Yugoslavia and Poland for a decade and a half clearly 
r equire careful scrutiny. Whe~ we consider, further, that NATO trade 
with Eastern ~urope has rise~l to a level of $3.5 billion and other East-
West European relationships have greatly expanded, while we have continued 
to maintain a quasi -quarantine, the need for thoughtful review becomes 
even more evident. 
I would reiterate that prospects for an orderly improvement 
of our policies with respect to Europe or, at least, a safe reduction 
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in their burdens on the public, are likely to prove remote so long as 
there is a continuance of the present tensio~ in Berlin. 
It is the policy and, by this time, it should be clear to 
all that it is the policy of the United States neither to be provoked 
into unnecessary war nor to surrender Allied rights in Berlin to force. 
Whatever is necessary to assert that policy will be done. But let there 
be no mistake &s to the cost of that situation to this nation. The 
increase of several billions in the defense budget in the last two years 
was closely rele.teC. to it. ~he call-up of National Gua.xdFD:'Ieu and 
Reserve conroo::Jpllts l e.s t year was directl.y related to it. The grant of 
standby authority to the President to do the same this year is related 
to it. 
I would poiut out, further, that the rights which we are seek-
ing to safegua:d in Berlin are Allied rights even though the principal 
responsibility a~d cost f or u~:>holdillg them has been borne by this nation 
since 1948. It eeems to me that, in the light of the altered situation 
in Europe, we may prope!'l.y inquire wnether the Berlin situation today 
is not at least as w~ch a responsibility of the Germans and the Europeans 
as it is of the United S+,s.+-es. We may proper1y inquire, whether or not 
in view of the catastrophi~ ~.m,pli...•atio~s which this situation contains, 
it has not become, to some extellt, a '-Torldwide responsibility to share. 
It would apeear to me that we have every right to insist that 
those whose interests Rre at least as directly involved as ours bear 
more equitably the risks a~d costs which are involved. At the least, 
it would appear to me that they join in an effort to find a rational 
alternative to this dangerous aud costly situation, by such honorable 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 22, Box 76, Folder 23, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
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or through conferences on Germany at which the Ettropean nations who may 
be prepared to contribute, as well as Germans, might be ;present. Indeed, 
it is not at nll inappropriate that both the United States and the Soviet 
Union move ~~ther back in such negotiations while the Europeans them-
selves make a greater e~fort to find answers to the problems posed at 
Berlin by a divieed Germany. 
In any event, I do not believe that we should be dissuaded 
from seeking more rational a"lswe:rs to t.he Berlin dilemna. a:J.d related 
questions by the raised eyebrows or the relatively cost-free reticences 
of others, so lo~g as we continue to bear the preponderant burden of cost 
and responsibility. 
To stand firm while circumstances move on is not to stand 
firm at all. It is to re~ede i~to irrelevance and a frustrating 
~otence from which the ~nbv escape may indeed be an ignominous retreat 
or a war of mutuel a·"':Ihile;i.;iou. ~.no Pres:tdent deserves to be sustained 
at home and by allies abroad as he el!gages in an uuremi tting search for 
a better Mswer to the dilE::Llla. And the hour is indeed already very 
late in Berlin. 
I have discussed t:1zse matters with you, tonight, notwith-
standing the fact that the w.!.~ds of October have already begun to kindle 
the political fires of November. I have felt free to do so because 
these questions of a changing Europe and our foreign policies will be 
with us all regardless of the outcome of the election. 
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With the Presid~t remains the awesome responsibility of 
decision. He will have to make the decisions--decisions on which 
hinge the security, the peace and the well-being of generations. 
In all frankness, the decisions which are reached with regard to 
foreign policy sre not likely to differ si~ificantly whatever the 
political composition of the next Congress. In these national 
matters, I am confic!ent that President Kennedy will continue to 
have the support of -the preponderance of the merubership of Congress, 
as did his predecessor. And I am confident, too, that he will have 
the preponderant support of the people of the United States. 
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